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TAGS: [KDEM](#) [MOPS](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KS](#) [AF](#)
SUBJECT: PLANNED SOUTH KOREAN PRT IN AFGHANISTAN: A FEW
MORE DETAILS

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15. (C) We also passed along to DCM Park two questions arising from the field. First, how much assistance in ensuring the security of their new PRT and its operations were the South Koreans likely to seek from the U.S.? Second, what would be the relationship of a South Korean PRT to any U.S. PRT also operating in the areas of their deployment? On the first, Park indicated Seoul is well aware that security is deteriorating even in the north; that the situation in Kapisa adjacent to their likely preferred location, Parwan, is "very bad"; and that it would not be possible to guarantee their people "100 percent security." He said simply that "we will do our best" but "may need some assistance from the U.S. side in this regard" (not further defined).

16. (C) On the question of de-confliction, Park believed that for political reasons at least, Seoul would want to have an "independent" facility, but he did not think his authorities had focused on its relationship with a neighboring U.S. PRT. Certainly, he said, they would want their people to coordinate, but he felt certain Seoul had not focused on the notion of "lead" or "support" roles. Park referred to earlier discussions between the last South Korea team to visit Afghanistan and the U.S. military task force on Bagram regarding a possible geographic or task-specific division of responsibilities in Parwan. If both Korean and U.S. PRTs there would have strong reasons for focusing on the Bagram area, he suggested a specialization by task might make sense: the Koreans could concentrate on development while the U.S. could devote itself primarily to security and governance. The Korean DCM undertook to pass along the questions for further consideration in Seoul.

17. (C) Comment: We infer that, at a minimum, the South Koreans will be looking for U.S. assurances that quick reaction force intervention could be provided, if necessary, to any Korean PRT in Parwan. This may be of some concern to us, since the Koreans, as a small nation that already withdrew its military from Afghanistan once after the loss of

a soldier, could become an attractive target for insurgent attack.

18. (SBU) If the South Koreans do seek to establish a wholly separate, development-only PRT, they will be breaking new ground. According to the ISAF model, PRTs are intended to address all three lines of operation (security, governance, development), and we know of none that currently focuses exclusively on development. There is also no precedent for having two truly separate PRTs operating in the same province (although the degree of the South Korean,s &independence8 remains to be clarified). There are, however, many examples of multi-national PRTs, including a few with task specialization. At the PRT in Mazar-e Sharif, for example, the Swedes are the lead nation and their partners, the Finns, focus on corrections and police training. In Ghazni, the Poles bring their own resources to the single, U.S.-led PRT, but are co-located and coordinate closely with us.
EIKENBERRY